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EXDIS

DELHI PASS CODEL NUNN

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: OREP (NUNN, SAM) PK
 SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
 - YAQUB KHAN NOVEMBER 27

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: CODEL NUNN MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND HIS DEPUTIES FOR OVER TWO HOURS NOVEMBER 27. IN AN INITIAL 60 MINUTE TOUR DE FORCE, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN BLENDED PHILOSOPHY, LITERARY ALLUSIONS, AND HISTORICAL FACT TO EXPLAIN PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTIONS ON REGIONAL, STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STATE OF PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. CITING THE EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF STRATEGIC BALANCES AS KEY TO UNDERSTANDING RECENT HISTORY IN SOUTH/SOUTHWEST ASIA, YAQUB DISCUSSED THE EFFECTS OF THE SHAH'S COLLAPSE (LIKE THE DEATH OF A STAR, THE COLLAPSE CAUSED ONE THOUSAND LINES OF FORCE TO RADIATE OUTWARD); AND SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THE VACUUM. NOTING THE CONVERGENCE OF U.S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS IN ALMOST EVERY AREA, YAQUB EXPLAINED THE STRENGTH AND DURABILITY OF PAKISTAN'S TIES WITH CHINA AND EMPHASIZED THAT A STRONG, SELF-

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CONFIDENT PAKISTAN CAN STAND FIRM FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN; PURSUE ITS PEACE INITIATIVE WITH INDIA; SEARCH FOR WAYS TO REINTEGRATE IRAN IN THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS; BOLSTER STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF; AND PROMOTE MODERATION IN THE UN, NAM AND OIC.
END SUMMARY.

3. SENATORS NUNN, JOHNSTON, GLENN AND SASSER MET NOVEMBER 27 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN, FOREIGN SECRETARY NAIK, ADDITIONAL SECRETARIES SATTAR, SHARYAR KHAN, KHAISHGI, HYDER AND SHAIKH; DIRECTORS GENERAL AFRIDI, SADDIQI, QAZI; AND DIRECTORS KHALID AND FATMI. AMBASSADOR, POLCOUNSELOR AND SENATE STAFFERS ALSO ATTENDED ON THE U.S. SIDE.

THE SHAH PROMOTED STABILITY:

4. YAQUB CITED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM AND U.K. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF AS TWO EPIC FACTORS THAT SET IN MOTION THE CHAIN OF EVENTS OF THE MID-1970S AND EARLY-1980S. FOLLOWING THOSE TWO EVENTS, IRAN--WITH U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT AND ARMS--EMERGED AS A PILLAR OF REGIONAL STABILITY. THE SOVIETS SAW NO OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPLOIT INSTABILITY IN THE REGION (EXCEPT BY SUBVERSION WHICH WAS CONTINUAL); THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE WAS IN MAJOR EQUILIBRIUM. AT THE SAME TIME, IN AFGHANISTAN, UNTIL ZAHIR SHAH FELL, THERE WAS ALSO MINOR EQUILIBRIUM--THE KING WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS, THE PAKISTANIS, THE IRANIANS, AND OTHERS. ONCE THE KING WAS REPLACED BY DAQUD IN 1973, THE SOVIETS SAW A TEMPORARY SHIFT IN THE EQUILIBRIUM TOWARDS THEM, AND PURSUED EFFORTS TO PROTECT THESE GAINS. WHEN THE SHAH OF IRAN SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED TO WEAN DAQUD FROM THE SOVIETS, THE SOVIET GAIN WAS DIMINISHED AND THEY REACTED, IN THE END CAUSING DAQUD'S OVERTHROW BY A COMMUNIST REGIME. EVEN THIS MINOR DISTURBANCE IN THE EQUILIBRIUM MIGHT HAVE BEEN TOLERABLE HAD NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHAH OF IRAN'S REGIME BEGUN TO CRUMBLE--FINALLY TO FALL IN 1979. HIS COLLAPSE PROFOUNDLY ALTERED THE BALANCE OF FORCES. THE EFFECTS, LIKE THE DEATH OF A STAR, HAVE YET TO PLAY OUT FULLY.

5. THE SHAH'S DEMISE, BY PLUNGING THE AREA INTO INSTABILITY, GAVE AN OPENING TO THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN LED TO THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, RAISED SPECTORS OF INSTABILITY THROUGHOUT THE PERSIAN GULF, SPLIT THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD, AND PROVOKED THE WEAKNESS WHEREBY ISRAEL COULD ATTACK LEBANON.

WHY THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN:

6. YAQUB POSITED FOUR EXPLANATIONS, SUPPLYING AT LEAST PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS:

-- (A) STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL--THE SOVIETS WERE CERTAIN THE

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U.S. WAS PREOCCUPIED AND TOO FAR REMOVED TO REACT; THE SHAH WAS GONE; AFGHANISTAN SEEMED AN OPPORTUNITY TOO GOOD TO ALLOW TO ESCAPE. WITH LUCK, THE SOVIETS EXPECTED THEY COULD SWALLOW AFGHANISTAN AND BE POISED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO MOVE SOUTHWARD

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 WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE.

-- (B) BORDER/TACTICAL--THE SOVIETS WERE ADVANCING WORLDWIDE. THEY DERIVED GREAT PROPAGANDA VALUE FROM TWEAKING AMERICAN WEAKNESSES IN THE EARLY 70S, AS WELL AS ITS HUMILIATION IN IRAN IN THE LATE 1970S. IN BOTH YEMENS, ETHIOPIA, CUBA, ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN, MOVEMENT WAS IN THE SOVIET FAVOR. THEY EXPECTED LITTLE RESISTANCE FROM PAKISTAN, AND ENVISIONED A SHORT, SHARP ANTI-GUERILLA EFFORT. THE AFFECT OF PICKING OFF AFGHANISTAN WOULD BE TO ADD LUSTER TO THE GROWING MYTH OF SOVIET INVINCIBILITY.

-- (C) THEATER/TACTICAL--THE SOVIETS TOOK PREEMPTIVE ACTION TO PROP-UP/REESTABLISH A COMMUNIST REGIME AND TO PRECLUDE A RIGHT WING COUP.

-- (D) IDEOLOGIC--THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO BRACE UP AND PROTECT ITS SOUTHERN REPUBLICS FROM A TIDE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

7. WHATEVER THE CAUSE OF THE SOVIET ACTION, THE EFFECT HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE SOVIETS' DIRECTION. WHAT HAS STYMIED THE SOVIET EFFORTS TO WIN IN AFGHANISTAN IS PAKISTAN'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO STAND FIRM. LIKE THE KEYSTONE IN AN ARCH, PAKISTAN IS CAUGHT FACING PRESSURES CONVERGING FROM ALL SIDES--THOSE FROM THE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN, FROM A SUSPICIOUS AND HOSTILE INDIA, AND FROM IRAN STILL RACKED BY ITS REVOLUTIONARY TURMOIL.

INDIA:

8. YAQUB REITERATED PAST STATEMENTS THAT PAKISTAN WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE PEACE AND NOT BE DEFLECTED. HE NOTED THAT THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION HAD SET IN MOTION FORCES THAT COULD LEAD TO THE DISSOLUTION OF INDIA. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT INDIAN INSTABILITY INEVITABLY WOULD AGGRAVATE PAKISTAN'S OWN CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES. HE HIGHLIGHTED THE CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT THE U.S. ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN--"SINCE 1981, ARE WE MORE WAR LIKE, MORE BELLICOSE, PANICKED OR HYSTERICAL?" HIS ANSWER WAS NO. PAKISTAN IS ABLE TO PRESS FORWARD WITH ITS PEACE INITIATIVE, EVEN IN THE FACE OF PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND FROM REVOLUTION IN IRAN. PAKISTAN WANTS GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA, BUT IT WILL NOT ACCEPT INDIAN DOMINATION.

PAKISTAN-U.S.:

9. U.S. MORAL SUPPORT HAS MEANT "A HELL OF A LOT"--FAR MORE THAN MATERIAL SUPPORT. IT HAS ENABLED PAKISTAN TO STAND UP TO PROVOCATIONS, SUBVERSION, AND SOVIET DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT LOOK IMPOTENT. CONFIDENCE DERIVED FROM ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. HAS ENABLED PAKISTAN TO ACT WITH MATURITY VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS, IRAN, AND THE PERSIAN GULF. IN A SLAP AT POLITICIANS AND FORMER MFA "LUMINARIES" (READ AGA SHAHI) WHO CALLED FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH THE DRA AND AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS, YAQUB SAID THE SOVIETS ASSUME THESE PUBLIC FIGURES REPRESENT THE GENERAL PUBLIC ATTITUDES, THEY DO NOT!

BENEFITS OF PAKISTAN SELF-CONFIDENCE:

10. NUMEROUS BENEFITS DERIVE FROM PAKISTAN'S WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO WITHSTAND THE CONVERGING PRESSURES. AMONG THESE ARE:

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-- A STRONG PAKISTAN DETERMINATION TO THWART SOVIET

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OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION.

-- A PAKISTAN ABLE TO BUTTRESS SECURITY IN THE GULF AREA.
YAQUB ALLUDED TO MILITARY COOPERATION AND PROGRESS, BUT
AVOIDED DETAILS.

-- AN ABILITY TO BRING IRAN OUT OF ITS ISOLATION.
DESPITE IRANIAN SUSPICIONS, FRIENDSHIP IS BEING
REESTABLISHED. BY ASSURING IRAN DOES NOT FEEL HEMMED IN,
THE POSSIBILITY IS REDUCED THAT IT WILL STRIKE OUT IN
DESPERATION. HOPEFULLY, ALSO, IT WILL HELP TO MODERATE
SOME OF THE IRANIAN POLICIES THAT PAKISTAN TOO OPPOSES.

-- PAKISTAN'S ABILITY TO STICK WITH ITS EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH WITH INDIA NORMAL RELATIONS--ONE OF EQUALITY.

INDIRECT TALKS/NEGOTIATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN:

11. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT AFGHAN NEGOTIATIONS
AND A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT, YAQUB
REPEATED HIS OFTEN STATED BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS EVALUATE
ALL SITUATIONS BY MEASURING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES.
THUS PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD MUST KEEP ON A VARIETY OF
PRESSURES--USING A JUDICIOUS BLEND OF DIPLOMATIC SUASION
(MULTI-LATERALLY IN UNGA, OIC, AND VIA BILATERAL RELATIONS
E.G. BETWEEN THE U.S./SOVIETS AND PRC/SOVIETS). MILITARY
PRESSURE ALSO IS NEEDED--THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS NEED THE
MEANS TO FIGHT ON. THEY CANNOT WIN A MILITARY VICTORY,
BUT THEY CAN GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATING TRACK.
HE VOICED SKEPTICISM THAT THERE CAN BE A FAVORABLE
NEGOTIATED OUTCOME, BUT TERMED ANY EFFORTS TO PROLONG THE
FIGHTING (E.G., TO BLEED THE SOVIETS) AS CALLOUS TO THE
AFGHAN PEOPLE.

12. YAQUB SAID THE SOVIETS SHOULD WANT A SETTLEMENT, SINCE
IT WOULD GIVE THEM GREATER FREEDOM OF MANEUVER ON THE
EASTERN FLANK (E.G. WITH CHINA) OR IN THE WEST. THE
SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT A RIGHTIST GOVERNMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN, SINCE THAT WOULD BE A DAGGER POINTED AT
THEIR HEARTLANDS. THUS, THE PROBLEM IS TO FIND A REGIME
THAT WOULD BE NOT SO ANTI-SOVIET THAT IT WOULD BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME ONE
THAT THE AFGHANS COULD ACCEPT. FINDING SUCH AN
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO GOVERN WOULD ENABLE THE PREVIOUS
EQUILIBRIUM TO BE RESTORED. FOR PAKISTAN'S PART, ITS
ONLY DESIRE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES.

RELIGION AS A FORCE IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD:

13. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION OF WHERE DOES THE CURRENT
FLOW OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE IN THE MIDDLE EAST LEAD, YAQUB
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISLAMIC TIDE IS RUNNING STRONG.
THIS IS AN APPARENT REACTION TO THE FACT THAT LOCAL
CULTURES WERE FROZEN DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD. OFTEN,
IN FACT, THE COLONIAL CULTURES WERE THE ANTITHESIS OF
THE LOCAL CULTURES. NOW, AFTER INDEPENDENCE, PEOPLE ARE
SEARCHING AGAIN FOR THEIR IDENTITY. TO FIND
AUTHENTICITY, MANY HAVE TURNED BACK TO RELIGION. HE

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NOTED THAT, IN SUCH SITUATIONS, THE PENDULUM TENDS TO SWING TO THE EXTREMES, BUT OVER TIME THE EXTREMES CAN BE MODERATED.

PAKISTAN-CHINA:

14. RESPONDING TO A STATEMENT THAT THE PRC AND PAKISTAN ARE STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, YAQUB NOTED THAT IT IS A RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS ENDURED MANY CHANGES. AS AN EXPLANATION FOR THE DURABILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP, HE HARKENED BACK TO 1967 WHEN, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES, HE WENT TO BEIJING TO SOLICIT CHINESE HELP IN REARMING A DEFEATED PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES. THE CHINESE PROVIDED 200 TANKS, AND EQUIPMENT FOR TWO DIVISIONS, AT ALMOST NO COST. WHEN YAQUB TRIED TO EXPRESS PAKISTAN'S THANKS TO CHOU EN-LAI, CHOU RESPONDED THAT NO THANKS WERE DUE, AS PAKISTAN HAD ALREADY DONE MUCH FOR THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA. CHOU POINTED

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OUT THAT IN THE 60S, PAKISTAN HAD BEEN CHINA'S ONLY WINDOW ON THE WORLD. IT BEFRIENDED THE PRC, EVEN WHEN IT WAS TIED TO THE U.S. VIA SEATO--A TREATY ORGANIZATION AIMED AT CONTAINING CHINA. PAKISTAN HAD RISKED ITS RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., AND INVITED SOVIET ANIMOSITY. IT HAD HELPED BRING CHINA INTO THE MAINSTREAM AND STOOD BY IT. IT WAS A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALS CHOU NOTED, AND NO DOLLAR VALUE COULD BE ATTACHED TO IT. IN ACCEPTING THIS, YAQUB SAID POINTEDLY, THEY AGREED NOTHING UNDERMINES A RELATIONSHIP MORE THAN WHEN THERE IS A GIVEN AND A TAKER.

PAKISTAN--THE NEW REGIONAL POWER?

15. IN ADDITION TO OTHER POINTS ON IRAN, YAQUB ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT TRYING TO REPLACE THE SHAH'S IRAN AS A REGIONAL POWER. HOWEVER, IF PAKISTAN COULD SURVIVE "IN A SEA OF TROUBLE", IT WOULD BUTTRESS STABILITY IN THE REGION--AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN PAKISTAN WOULD STABILIZE THE REGION, AND THIS IS WHERE PAKISTAN AND U.S. INTERESTS CONVERGE.

ELECTIONS:

16. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR NUNN'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER UPCOMING ELECTIONS WOULD CHANGE PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, AND HIS EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD OCCUR, YAQUB STRESSED THAT ELECTIONS WILL OCCUR. HE INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY, SINCE THE THRUST OF THE POLICY WAS IN PAKISTAN'S INTEREST AND HAD BROAD SUPPORT. HE NOTED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, EVEN FOR MILITARY REGIMES, TO OUTFRONT PUBLIC OPINION. IN FACT, HE POINTED OUT, MILITARY GOVERNMENTS NEED TO BE MORE SENSITIVE THAN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS SINCE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO LINKS TO THE PEOPLE.

NARCOTICS:

17. SENATOR NUNN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING ON WITH THE BUSINESS OF SUPPRESSING NARCOTICS. HE INDICATED

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THANKS FOR WHAT HAD BEEN DONE AND THANKS FOR THE STRONG
STEPS THAT HE EXPECTED WERE STILL TO BE TAKEN. YAQUB
ACKNOWLEDGED THE SENATOR'S POINT.

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18. THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH CODEL
NUNN.

19. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HINTON
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

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